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ABSTRACT 
The popularity of Voice over the Internet Protocol (VoIP) is increasing as the cost 
savings and ease of use is realised by a wide range of home and corporate users. 
However, the technology is also attractive to criminals. This is because VoIP is a 
global telephony service, in which it is difficult to verify the user’s identification. 
The security of placing such calls may also be appealing to criminals, as many 
implementations use strong encryption to secure both the voice payload as well as 
to control messages making monitoring such VoIP calls difficult since 
conventional methods such as wire-tapping is not applicable to VoIP calls. 
Therefore, other methods of recovering electronic evidence and information from 
VoIP are required.  This research looks at what protocol evidence remains after a 
VoIP call has taken place examining both a virtual hard disk and the Random 
Access Memory (RAM).  
This paper proposes a set of identifiable credentials based on packet header 
information contained within the VoIP protocol stack. A series of controlled tests 
were undertaken whereby these credentials were forensically searched for on a 
virtual machine which was used to make the VoIP call. This experiment was then 
repeated by a search for the same protocol credentials within the RAM. 
Keywords: Computer forensics, digital evidence, electronic evidence, Voice over 
Internet Protocol, VoIP, memory forensics 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology has radically changed the way 
that telephony data is communicated and thus it has begun to revolutionise the 
Australian Telecommunications industry. With the tremendous growth in 
popularity and broadband access capability to Internet, such technologies have 
emerged that allows telephone calls to be routed over Internet infrastructure rather 
than the traditional Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) infrastructure. 
This technology, called VoIP, uses the Internet Protocol (IP) to route packets 
containing small portions of voice conversations between the callers.  
The popularity of VoIP is increasing as the cost savings and ease of use is realised 
by a wide range of home and corporate users. However, the technology is also 
attractive to criminals, especially the non-carrier VoIP. This is because (1) VoIP 
is a global telephony service, in which it is difficult to verify the user’s personal 
identification (2), the security of placing such calls may also be appealing to 
criminals, as many implementations use strong encryption to secure both the 
voice payload as well as to control messages, and (3) monitoring or tracing such 
VoIP calls is difficult since conventional methods such as wire-tapping is not 
applicable to VoIP calls.  Therefore, other methods of recovering evidence and 
information from voice over IP protocol are required.  It is essential that forensic 
computing researchers devise methods to allow law enforcement agencies to 
overcome some of the aspects of this method of telephony that are advantageous 
to criminals.  
This introduction provides an overview of the VoIP transport protocols and a 
signalling protocol. This establishes the information from which it is possible to 
forensically retrieve fields from the protocol headers as well as user registration 
information for a VoIP call.  
VoIP is not a single protocol in itself but rather a collection of a number of co-
existing and competing protocols, which are used for setting up, maintaining and 
tearing down calls and protocols for the encapsulation and transportation of 
packets over the Internet. This collection of protocols referred to as the protocol 
stack contains the Internet Protocol (IP) (Postel, 1981a).  The IP is responsible for 
providing the internet addresses in its internet header allowing packets to be 
routed from their source to a destination IP address. The IP header format is 
shown below in Figure1.   
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(1) 
 
17 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – IP packet header format 
 
A reliable protocol for the transmission of packets across the Internet is the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) (Postel, 1981b), which guarantees delivery 
because both lost and corrupt packets are re-transmitted. However, for real-time 
VoIP calls there is no purpose in re-transmitting lost packets. TCP makes use of 
flow control, which temporarily suspends the transmission of packets until the 
corrupt packet is successfully re-transmitted.  
Instead, the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) (Postel, 1980), although a less 
reliable protocol since packet delivery is not guaranteed, is more suited to the 
requirements of VoIP. The selected system is thus an IP/UDP protocol stack. The 
IP datagram provides a source and destination address to identify the sending and 
receiving host but further information is required to provide an exact delivery 
location. This information is provided by the UDP, which adds the source and 
destination port numbers. The combination of an IP address and port number 
provides a socket. Common applications are configured to work via specific ports. 
The IP/UDP stack and UDP header format is shown below in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 – IP/UDP stack showing the UDP packet header format 
 
The reason for choosing UDP over TCP is that UDP does not guarantee delivery 
of packets whereas TCP does. TCP guaranteed delivery is achieved by the re-
transmission of lost or out of sequence packets, which is undesirable for real-time 
audio. 
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The Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) (Schulzrinne et al, 2003) provides 
network transport for real-time applications such as transmitting audio over a 
packet switched network. The RTP protocol is chosen for the transmission of 
voice data because it adds additional information such as a sequence number to 
each packet to provide the application receiving the audio an opportunity to 
sequence packets in the correct order within a buffer and also provides a 
timestamp for each individual packet which allows playback of the audio at 
regular intervals. The protocol stack has now become an IP/UDP/RTP stack. Not 
that the use of RTP is not necessary to make and receive VoIP calls, it simply 
adds additional data to assist the receiving application with packet order and 
playback as well as allowing multiple users to facilitate VoIP conferencing. The 
IP/UDP/RTP stack and RTP packet header format is shown below in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3 – IP/UDP/RTP stack showing the RTP packet header 
 
The sequence numbers and timestamps are unique for each packet. The sequence 
numbers are incremented by one for each packet sent allowing the destination to 
re-order packets that have arrived out of sequence and detect packet loss. The 
timestamp conveys information relating to the sampling of data packets. 
The Synchronisation Source (SSRC) field identifies the source of the 
synchronization e.g. computer clock whereas the Contributing Source (CSRC) 
field identifies the source of the individual contributions that make up the single 
data stream payload for the packet. It is not necessary to use the RTP to 
participate in a VoIP call. VoIP applications such as Skype (Download, 2009a) do 
not make use of the RTP whereas X-Lite (Download, 2009d) does. The 
experiments performed within this research were conducted on both applications 
Skype and X-Lite but only X-Lite results are discussed since the RTP adds an 
extra protocol from which fields from within the protocol header may be searched 
for.  
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An audio sample is packetised and transported across a network. If the packet is 
too large and needs to be fragmented or originated from multiple sources, then 
each fragment will have the same CSRC to identify that they have come from the 
same data stream but different sequence numbers, allowing them to be re-
constructed in the correct sequence whereas different sources will have a unique 
CSRC. This is used for synchronization at the destination.  
The protocols IP, UDP and RTP are essentially protocols which encapsulate and 
transport packet data containing the information necessary to identify the source 
and destination of the calling parties and deliver the payload containing the voice 
component. The following protocol, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
(Rosenberg, et al, 2002) is a signalling protocol used to establish, maintain and 
tear-down the call when terminated. SIP allows the calling parties called User 
Agents (UAs) to locate one another using a network of proxy servers, which 
allows UAs to be registered and invite other UAs to join in an Internet multimedia 
call called a session, based on HTTP requests/responses. Each transaction consists 
of a request that invokes a particular method and at least one response as shown in 
Figure 4.  Jane uses her VoIP application to send an ‘Invite’ request to Joe. The 
‘Invite’ request is a SIP method that specifies the action that Jane wants Joe to 
take, accepting the call from Jane. The ‘Invite’ request passes through two proxy 
servers to reach Joe, initiating a response from each proxy, (1) – (5). The 
destination ‘Ringing’ response from Joe is returned to the sender again passing 
through each proxy, (6) – (8). Confirmation of accepting the ‘Invite’ request is 
confirmed with an ‘OK’ response from Joe to Jane, (9) – (11). The media session 
can start once Jane has acknowledged the ‘OK’ response, (12). The session can be 
terminated by either party but is shown to be Joe in this instance, (13) – (14). 
 
Figure 4 – SIP session between two UAs  
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As previously discussed, VoIP represents a packet based Internet technology for 
voice communication as opposed to traditional telephone calls. This will impact 
law enforcement as wire-tapping is no longer valid. A new architecture is required 
for the lawful interception of VoIP traffic as varying VoIP applications and 
Internet technologies means that IP packets will travel in dissimilar paths making 
it difficult to choose an intercept point (Karpagavinayagam et al, 2007).   
Possible interception entities can be divided into two areas, those belonging to the 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) and those belonging to the Law Enforcement 
Agency (LEA), which may be located within the ISP or external to it. Entities 
related to the ISP include signalling, the setup, maintaining and tearing down of 
IP calls. The data entity is responsible for collecting the IP voice traffic which 
may be implemented on the same sub-network as the VoIP gateway, which 
connects to your existing telephone line. Entities related to the LEA may exist 
within the ISP architecture but remain under the control of the LEA, otherwise the 
gathered information requires authorisation from the ISP for access and 
decryption keys. 
There is no single entity that VoIP traffic may be intercepted, however, the more 
central the components are on the signalling path makes lawful interception of 
VoIP more easy to perform (Seedorf 2008). Unfortunately, VoIP is characterised 
by a high degree of decentralisation, especially for mobile users connecting to the 
Internet for short periods of time. This may result in a move from nodes in a 
network under the authority of Law Enforcement Agencies to a situation where 
lawful interception is performed by requests to the Internet operators. For 
example, Skype uses proprietary encryption as opposed to published standards, 
DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). This 
requires LEAs to approach Skype for the encryption keys if they require captured 
VoIP traffic to be decrypted. 
The VoIP application Skype is popular, but also the subject of numerous network 
forensics investigations because of its ability to traverse network address 
translation and bypass firewalls (Leung and Chan, 2009). Any Skype client, an 
individual with the Skype application deployed on their computer system for the 
purpose of making VoIP calls, may unwillingly become a super node on the 
Skype communication path maintain the Skype overlaying network, which may 
pose considerable risk to corporate businesses.  Only by analysing Skype traffic, 
its communication network will it become possible to detect Skype UDP sockets. 
This will allow the blocking of Skype traffic. 
Several models currently exist for investigation in digital forensics but the 
framework from the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) provides 
sequential steps for digital forensic analysis. These steps are shown below: 
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? Identifcation  
? Preservattion  
? Collection 
? Examination 
? Analysis 
? Presentation 
 
The examination and analysis of captured memory is performed in a read-only 
fashion, which leaves the original information un-altered. 
As well as capturing the VoIP data, protocols, call configuration, raw packets 
with payloads, network forensic patterns (Pelaez and Fernandez, 2009) may be 
used to collect details about the VoIP user’s activities from monitoring 
components in the network architecture such as incoming and outgoing numbers, 
geographical location, call duration with start and end times. A forensic pattern, a 
systematic approach to the forensic collection and analysis of data may allow for 
real-time analysis of VoIP captured traffic. 
In previous work (Simon and Slay, 2006; Slay and Simon , 2008; Simon and Slay 
2009), memory forensics have been carried out on computers (on various 
platforms) to extract VoIP transactions.  This is a move away from VoIP network 
forensics to looking at specific memory storage areas within a computer to 
discover what artefacts of the VoIP call remain after the call has been terminated. 
It should be noted that it is not the purpose of this paper to provide a framework 
for digital forensic collection but rather demonstrate through experimentation that 
more information may be gathered from the contents of RAM as opposed to hard 
disk storage media for digital artefacts left behind after a VoIP call. As the cost of 
hard disk storage reduces, it allows larger sizes of physical memory storage 
shipped with computer systems. The increase in the size of RAM is not so 
prevalent, allowing RAM to be searched much faster, gigabytes of RAM as 
opposed to terabytes of hard disks. The seizure of RAM contents may be 
accomplished by the seizure of a computer system that is still powered on or 
covertly over the Internet without the user’s knowledge. 
2. EXPERIMENT 1 
The recovery and analysis of digital forensic evidence from a computer 
forensic examination is well documented and rigorously implemented in order 
to prevent ambiguous interpretation of results within a court of law. This area 
of memory forensics can be used to recover documents, images and emails 
from a target computer system. 
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However, there is little research in the area of VoIP forensics, the art of 
applying memory forensic techniques to identify VoIP packets that remain on a 
computer system after a VoIP call. The proposed research builds upon the 
previous work (Simon and Slay, 2006; Slay and Simon , 2008) of the Defence 
and Systems Institute (DASI) at the University of South Australia. The 
experimental setup is shown below in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 – VoIP call and packet detection setup 
 
The experimental setup involved making a single VoIP call between two 
computers using Windows Operating System (OS) within a virtual machine 
(Download, 2009b). Each virtual machine was cloned from a virtual hard disk 
with a fresh install of Windows OS. The use of virtualisation creates a contained 
environment into which the X-Lite VoIP application is installed. X-Lite makes 
use of the SIP protocol, thus requiring a user to first register their details with a 
SIP server to initiate a VoIP call. 
Once the call is initiated, both users may communicate with each other until one 
party terminates the call. Once the call is terminated the virtual machine is shut 
down at endpoint B and the virtual hard disk is analysed using X-Ways 
(Download, 2009e) forensic software.  
The purpose of the packet sniffer is to monitor and collect the packets being 
transferred between both endpoints capturing the protocols and the payload as 
they pass from the source of the call to its destination and responses from the 
destination to the source. The packet sniffer used was Wireshark (Download, 
2009c). 
2.1 Target Artefacts  
The target artefacts are based on protocol fields captured using Wireshark as well 
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as signalling information as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Session Initiation Protocol: 
‐ Request-Line: 
‐ Invite sip:8889215862@sip.pennytel.com 
Method: Invite 
‐ Message Header 
Contact:sip:8889215864@119.40.108.72:26610 
‐ To: “david”< sip:8889215862@sip.pennytel.com> 
SIP Display info: “david” 
‐ SIP to address:sip:8889215862@sip.pennytel.com 
  SIP to address User Part: 8889215862 
 SIP to address Host Part: sip.pennytel.com 
‐ From:“8889215864”sip:8889215864@sip.pennytel.com 
 
Figure 6 – SIP Invite request 
 
Before a SIP call can be made, individuals or organisations are required to register 
with a SIP registration server, and are issued with a unique SIP address, which 
takes the form of users@hosts, where the user portion can be a name or telephone 
number and the host portion can be a domain name or network address, for 
example, 8889215862@sip.pennytel.com. The user part 8889215862 uniquely 
identifies the user agent and the host part identifies pennytel.com as the SIP 
service provider. This is performed using the SIP ‘Register’ request. Once 
registered, user agents can communicate with each other with the assistance of 
proxy servers, which can forward requests and responses to another proxy which 
is located closer to the actual end user agent. 
 
Target artefacts based on SIP signalling protocol are:                                          
 
user Ids 889215862 & 8889215864                                                                                              
host, pennytel.com (SIP service provider)                                                                                 
SIP server IP address                                                                                                                  
Call-ID 
Figure 7 – Target SIP artefacts 
 
Once the VoIP call was initiated, the audio file English.wav lasting 24 seconds 
was replayed in succession 5 times. The file English.wav consists of spoken 
power words "welcome, peace, love, joy, hope, compassion, mystery, unity, 
equality, creativity, freedom, health, spirit, inspiration, release". 
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The following protocol information captured from frame 797 of the VoIP call 
using Wireshark is shown below in figure 8. This information is used to form a 
byte search pattern for a manual search of the virtual hard disk using X-Ways. 
 
Frame 797 (134 bytes on wire, 134 bytes captured)                                                                     
Frame Number: 797                                                                                                                       
Frame Length: 134 bytes                                                                                                               
Protocols in frame: eth:ip:udp:rtp                                                                                                 
Ethernet Protocol:                                                                                                                           
Destination: Vmware_c1:09:d9 (00:0c:29:c1:09:d9)                                                                    
Source: IntelCor_4a:d6:26 (00:21:6a:4a:d6:26)                                                                           
Internet Protocol:                                                                                                                            
Source: 192.168.0.102                                                                                                                     
Destination: 192.168.0.105                                                                                                             
Real-Time Transport Protocol:                                                                                                     
Synchronisation Source ID: 0xf1fa6792 (4059719570) 
 
Figure 8 – Wireshark capture of frame 797 
 
The Ethernet Protocol (Hornig, 1984) provides the physical Ethernet Hardware 
Address (EHA) more commonly referred to as the Media Access Control (MAC) 
address which is a unique identifier assigned by the  manufacturer of the Network 
Interface Card (NIC).   This enables X-Ways to search for the 6 byte source/ 
destination MAC address, the 4 byte source/destination IP address and the 4 byte 
SSRC captured by Wireshark as artefacts left behind as evidence of a VoIP call. 
2.2 Data Analysis and Results 
Data analysis was performed using X-ways forensic software to view the virtual 
hard disk within which the VoIP call took place. The virtual hard disk was not 
imaged or copied in any way, but rather viewed in read-only mode from its 
original location.  
Table 1 below shows the artefact results from performing a manual search and the 
number of hits.  
 
Table 1 – Search for signalling protocol artefacts 
 
Target – SIP signaling Hits 
192.168.0.102 0 
192.168.0.105 0 
8889215862 0 
8889215864 0 
Pennytel.com 0 
Call-id 0 
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The entire duration of the VoIP call was 183 seconds, consisting of 17,704 
frames, of which only 11 frames were related to the SIP at the start of the call 
(Invite – Trying – Ringing – Ack – Ok request/responses) and end of the call (Bye 
– Ok  request/response). The remaining 17,693 frames were RTP. The search for 
packet header artefacts is shown below in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 – Search for packet header artefacts 
 
Target – Eth/IP/UDP/RTP Hits 
0x 00 21 6a 4a d6 26 (eth MAC src) 0 
0x 00 0c 29 c1 09 d9 (eth MAC dst) 18 
0x c0 a8 00 66 (IP src 192.168.0.102) 1 
0x c0 a8 00 69 (IP dst 192.168.0.105) 3 
0x f1 fa 67 92 (RTP SSRC src) 0 
0x 22 14 ad 31 (RTP SSRC dst) 0 
 
The VoIP call was received by the X-Lite application within the virtual 
environment. The 18 hits for the virtual machine MAC address were related to the 
installation of the X-Lite application within the virtual environment and not from 
the VoIP call. The hits for the source and destination IP addresses were not within 
any meaningful context i.e. a statistically occurring random hit for that 4 byte hex 
pattern. The search analysis shows that there are no artefacts remaining from the 
SIP signalling protocol or packet header information. 
One may assume that the packet header information is only required to ensure that 
the payload reaches its destination, the virtual machine and is discarded as it is no 
longer required. The remaining encrypted payload will be utilised by the X-Lite 
application. Therefore an additional search can be performed for the encrypted 
payload. Subsequently, we have the original unencrypted source of the payload, 
English.wav, making it possible to also search for the decrypted payload at the 
destination virtual machine. 
Is it logical to assume that if the virtual machine exchanges in excess of 17,000 
RTP frames during the VoIP call that the latter frames are more likely to persist in 
memory? Table 3 below shows the search analysis for encrypted payload for 
latter occurring frames during the VoIP call.  
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Table 3 – Search for encrypted VoIP payload 
 
Encrypted payload for Frame Hit 
17,704 No 
17,600 No 
17,400 No 
17,200 No 
17,000 No 
16,500 No 
16,000 No 
15,000 No 
14,000 No 
 
A search for the content of the sound file English.wav also resulted in no hits. 
This may be due to the fact that the sound file is also contaminated with 
background noise when it is digitised by the VoIP application, altering its original 
byte content. 
2.3 Conclusion: Experiment 1 
The purpose of this research was to find digital evidence left behind in memory 
after a VoIP call had been received within a virtual environment. The resulting 
forensic analysis of the virtual hard disk using X-Ways has yielded no indication 
of packet header information from the VoIP transport protocols or the SIP 
signalling protocol artefacts persisting in memory once the call has been 
terminated. 
This initial research has resulted in a change in direction from performing search 
analysis in physical memory (such as hard disks) to investigating the digital 
artefacts which temporarily exist in RAM.  
If packet header information from the transport protocols can be recovered, 
including such fields as sequence numbers and timestamps, then this will allow 
partial reconstruction of the encrypted VoIP payload. However an additional 
question that arises is, ‘Does both the encrypted payload and decrypted payload 
persist in RAM at the same time, thus allowing reconstruction of the audible VoIP 
call?’, allowing for enough frames to exist in order to make human sense of the 
reconstruction. 
Previously, 183 seconds of voice required in excess of 17,000 frames. Assuming a 
minimum of 20 seconds of voice in order to make sense of the communication, 
this would require the reconstruction of almost 2000 frames. 
3. RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY 
The previous research, the search for digital artefacts, digital evidence that 
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persists in memory after the completion of a VoIP call within a virtual 
environment based on VoIP protocol information provided no evidence of the call 
having taken place. This situation can be overcome in different ways as outlined 
below. 
3.1 Lawful Interception 
Lawful interception has existed since the dawn of the PSTN. Wire tapping, as it is 
traditionally known, was an easy task to perform on analogue telecommunications 
devices. However, the interception of traffic across the Internet (ETSI, 2001) is 
substantially more difficult as Internet traffic may cross geographical boundaries 
where no Law exists to allow legal interception of IP based traffic. The Internet 
provider may provide no means for lawful interception within their network, 
either due to lack of physical means or the right of privacy to its customers. 
If a physical location within a network is chosen as the intercept point, then all 
traffic may be captured and not just traffic between the target machines. How 
does the Internet provider guarantee that non-targeted customers’ information is 
not being intercepted even by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). 
3.2 Live Forensic Analysis 
The distinction between live and post forensics is the nature in which digital 
evidence is recovered. Live forensics infers that the target machine is in use at the 
time potential evidence is collected. This would be a covert action, performed 
without the knowledge of the user. This in itself raises a number of questions:  
1. The legality of using of spyware which resides within a target machine, 
await the initiation of a VoIP call and perform a RAM capture? 
2. How is the spyware deployed? 
3. Does the spyware search the RAM contents and recovers the information 
it requires, packet header information from the VoIP transmission 
protocols, user identification used to log into the VoIP application or 
signalling protocol information, such as SIP service provide registration 
details? 
4. Or is the entire RAM contents processed on another machine which 
would require the RAM contents to be transmitted across the Internet? 
5. Would the user of the target machine notice degradation in processor 
capability, an increase in memory use or an increase in broadband 
upload? 
These are important considerations when constructing spyware but first the actual 
digital evidence which may be recovered from a RAM capture must be identified 
to determine the feasibility of injecting spyware onto a target machine. 
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3.3 Experiment 2 
The RAM experimental setup differs from the previous setup in that virtualisation 
is no longer used. Previously VoIP calls were made within a virtual environment 
and the virtual hard disk searched for digital artefacts persisting in memory. RAM 
analysis is more complicated, in that, to perform a RAM capture, the X-Ways 
forensic analysis software would have to be deployed within the virtual 
environment.  
Also the physical amount of RAM available for capture would be less than the 
system RAM which is hosting the virtual machine. Instead the RAM capture is 
performed on the system RAM of the endpoint machine. The experimental setup 
involved making a single VoIP call between two computers using Windows OS. 
Two VoIP applications were used, Skype and X-Lite for making the VoIP call at 
separate times. 
Once the VoIP call is initiated, both users may communicate with each other until 
the call is terminated. During the call X-Ways RAM editor is used to expose the 
system RAM, and a copy of the RAM contents is saved to a file. This file can 
then be manually searched using the X-Ways search function for target artefacts. 
Once the call is terminated and the search analysis of the RAM captured file is 
complete, the endpoint machine is shutdown to allow the contents of the RAM to 
dissipate. The contents of RAM are not permanent and will slowly disappear over 
time as the voltage supply decays to the cells holding the binary information 
(zeros and ones). After a significant amount of time the endpoint machine is re-
started and the process is repeated using a different VoIP application.  
3.4 Target Artefacts 
The target artefacts are the same for experiment 1, again based on protocol fields 
captured using Wireshark as well as signalling information. Once the VoIP call 
was initiated, the audio file Highway Blues.wma lasting 93 seconds was replayed 
in succession twice. This file was chosen because of its longer duration compared 
to the previous audio file English.wav.  
The following protocol information captured from frame 753 of the VoIP call 
using Wireshark is shown below. This information is used to form a byte search 
pattern for a manual search of the RAM file produced by X-Ways as shown in 
Figure 9 below. 
 
Frame 753 (214 bytes on wire, 214 bytes captured)                                                                    
Frame Number: 753                                                                                                                       
Frame Length: 214 bytes                                                                                                               
Protocols in frame: eth:ip:udp:rtp                                                                                                
Ethernet Protocol:                                                                                                                          
Source: Dell_a2:dd:cb  (00:24:e8:a2:dd:cb)                                                                                
Destination: IntelCor_4a:d6:26 (00:21:6a:4a:d6:26)                                                                  
Internet Protocol:                                                                                                                           
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Source: 192.168.0.102                                                                                                                  
Destination: 192.168.0.100                                                                                                           
Real-Time Transport Protocol:                                                                                                 
Synchronisation Source ID: 0x542ec3f5 (1412350965) 
 
Figure 9 – Wireshark capture of frame 753 
 
This enables X-Ways to search for the 6 byte source/destination MAC address, 
the 4 byte source/destination IP address and the 4 byte SSRC captured by 
Wireshark as artefacts left behind as evidence of a VoIP call.  
3.5 Data Analysis and Results 
Data analysis was performed using X-ways forensic software to view the RAM in 
editor mode allowing textual and hexadecimal searches to be performed. In 
addition, packet reconstruction software (Simon, 2008) was also used to identify 
packet information from the RAM captured file. This software retrieves all 
protocols involved in a VoIP call and displays them in a format that allows 
Wireshark to display the retrieved packets. 
Table 4 below shows the protocol information recovered by the packet 
reconstruction software.  
 
Table 4 – VoIP protocols recovered from software 
 
Protocol Hits 
SIP 3 
ETH/IP/UDP/RTP 454 
 
Analysis of the RAM capture file with the packet reconstruction software 
recovered 454 packets. The recovered packets are not in sequence order. They are 
in the order they were recovered from the RAM file. This is correct, as in reality, 
pages of memory in RAM would not be sequential as objects and processes may 
be moved in and out of RAM as they are required. Table 5 below shows the X-
Ways search for digital artefacts.  
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Table 5 – Search for packet header artefacts 
 
Target – SIP/Eth/IP/UDP/RTP Hits 
8889215862 (SIP user) 280 
8889215864 (SIP user) 149 
Pennytel (SIP host) 921 
119.40.108.72 (Server IP address) 81 
SIP Call-ID (MGFKNjg…) 24 
0x 00 24 e8 a2 dd cb (eth MAC src) 2402 
0x 00 21 6a 4a d6 26 (eth MAC dst) 1487 
0x c0 a8 00 66 (IP src 192.168.0.102) 1613 
0x c0 a8 00 64 (IP dst 192.168.0.100) 3112 
0x e4 bd 7b 03 (RTP SSRC src) 744 
0x 54 2e c3 f5 (RTP SSRC dst) 48 
 
The size of the RAM captured file was 3,620,888 KB. The most accurate 
identification for the existence of digital artefacts is the RTP synchronisation 
source identifier, in total 792 (744 + 48) packets were detected. This is 
considerably more that that detected by the packet reconstruction prototype 
software which still requires fine tuning. Alternatively, the 792 RTP packets may 
be fragmented, just partial packets containing the correct SSRC but missing 
information. The packet reconstruction software detected 454 full packets which 
could be viewed extensively in Wireshark. 
It would be a worthwhile exercise to examine closely the packets reconstructed by 
the software. To sequence them by their respective RTP sequence number to find 
several consecutive frames then search for them using X-Ways to determine their 
physical location in RAM. Are they also consecutive or appear to be random? 
This is shown below in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 – Byte offset for packets located in RAM 
 
IP Seq. 
No. 
RTP 
Timestamp 
RAM Offset 
(bytes) 
Difference 
(bytes) 
60514 0x 00 31 d9 cc 0160378936  
60515 0x 00 31 da 6c 0160370744 8192 
60516 0x 00 31 db 0c 0160362552 8192 
60517 0x 00 31 db ac 0160346168 16384 
60518 0x 00 31 dc 4c 0160329784 16384 
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Although each packet is only 214 bytes in size, consecutive packets appear to be 
separated by a multiple of 8192 bytes (8KB). This may be related to the size of 
the page files in memory. 
3.6 Conclusion: Experiment 2 
The purpose of this research was to find digital evidence left behind in RAM after 
a VoIP call had been received between two SIP endpoint machines. 
The resulting forensic analysis of RAM captured using X-Ways provided an 
abundance of digital artefacts from Ethernet and IP addresses, IP sequence 
numbers, RTP timestamps and SSRCs, all part of the VoIP transmission protocol 
packet header information, Also recovered was SIP signalling information 
identifying users, SIP provider(s) and SIP server IP address and call-ID(s). 
In addition, the use of packet reconstruction software applied to the RAM 
captured file also extracted a large number of packets.  
4. PARADIGM SHIFT – HARD DISK TO RAM FORENSICS 
The simplified experiments discussed previously provided an insight not 
previously investigated, the contents of RAM for VoIP artefacts left behind after a 
VoIP call. To investigate this further, the following experiments provide a 
definitive analysis of RAM captures for both X-Lite and Skype calls using packet 
searching software.  
4.1 Skype and X-Lite Call Analysis  
The following results are the analysis of a 4.0GB RAM capture performed after a 
single Skype call lasting 3 minutes on a laptop. The laptop was the powered down 
to allow the RAM contents to dissipate. A second RAM capture was performed 
the following day after 3 successive X-Lite calls, the first lasting 30 seconds, the 
second lasting 30 seconds and the third lasting 3 minutes. The remnants of calls 
that can be recovered in the RAM capture are compared against the Wireshark 
capture of the VoIP calls to identify the number of packets recovered versus 
packets from the VoIP call. The analysis is shown below in table 7.  
 
Table 7 – Skype and X-Lite call analysis 
VoIP 
Application 
Call 
durataion 
Packet count 
from Wireshark
RAM packets 
recovered 
(total) 
RAM packets 
recovered 
(unique) 
% of call 
recovered 
 
Skype 
 
180 seconds 
 
18,701 
 
41,959 
 
18,208 
 
97.4% 
 
X-Lite 
 
30 seconds 
 
3,097 
 
4,759 
 
3,093 
 
99.9% 
 
X-Lite 
 
30 seconds 
 
3,290 
 
5,488 
 
3,274 
 
99.5% 
 
X-Lite 
 
180 seconds 
 
9,089 
 
17,695 
 
9,063 
 
99.7% 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(1) 
 
32 
 
Note that the total amount of packets recovered from the RAM capture exceeds 
the original number of packets in the call. It was found that in some instances, 
packets existed in up to 6 different memory locations in RAM. These were 
filtered out to examine the number of unique packets recovered. Figure 6 is used 
to demonstrate how multiple X-Lite calls are separated from each other within a 
single RAM capture by observing the SSID (synchronisation source ID), unique 
to each call stream within the call. 
 
Figure 6 – X-Lite packet analysis 
 
4.2 X-Lite Call Registration and Setup 
The X-Lite VoIP application is chosen for detailed analysis of call registration 
and setup because this information is unencrypted and transported in packets in 
plain text. The X-Lite call id is a lengthy and unique character string. 
A search of the RAM capture using X-Ways forensic tool for the SIP registration 
call id, OTCWOTjimzI2OTK0NZRimGR4NJQ4ZDY1ZGE5Y2Q0ODC yields 
the X-Lite subscribe request for SIP pennytel identification 8889215864 
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(username). Each X-Lite call has a different call id for its setup, allowing each call 
id to be searched for and subsequently found in the RAM capture, for example the 
call 1 setup exchange captured by Wireshark is shown below in Figure 7.  
Invite request SIP/SDP 8889215862 (number being called) 
Invite request SIP/SDP 
100 Trying 
401  
401 Unauthorized 
Ack 
401 unauthorized 
Ack request 
SIP/SDP Invite 
SIP/SDP Invite 
SIP/SDP Invite 
100 Trying 
180 Ringing 
 
Figure 7 – X-Lite control signal during call setup 
 
Searching for call 1 id MjQ3ZGM2MDA3ZDI3NjI2yZNiMzcIYTM3NWE5MTQONTE 
using X-ways discovered more than 80 occurrences of the call id in the RAM 
capture, including Invite requests, Ack and also Bye, which identifies the call is 
terminated, ‘user hung up’. Armed with this information allows Law Enforcement 
to approach the identified SIP registrar, in this case pennytel, with the call id and 
the recovered sequence of packets for the X-Lite call with a request for the packet 
contents to be decrypted. It is not the purpose of this research to attempt packet 
payload decryption. 
5. FUTURE WORK 
The lack of VoIP protocol artefacts left behind on a virtual hard disk after a VoIP 
call resulted in a shift from disk forensics to RAM forensics. RAM forensics has 
successfully demonstrated the ability to recover VoIP protocol artefacts left 
behind in RAM after a VoIP call has taken place. 
This research is initially motivated to recover packet sequence information to 
allow VoIP payloads to be reconstructed correctly. However continuing upon this 
will be the identification of the end-user(s), using a track and trace capability. If a 
user wishes to remain anonymous, they will most likely spoof IP and MAC 
addresses or be hidden behind firewalls.  
The immediate foreseeable research is: 
? The further development of a software tool to recover packet 
information in sequence and extract the encrypted payload 
? identify the VoIP application from signalling and call setup packets 
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? perform a track and trace of VoIP end-users 
? understand the paging of virtual memory in RAM to identify and 
recover the decrypted audio component  
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